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Derrida himself (like Boyarin) was aware of Socrates’ “sophistic charm.”5
Yet he never understood it as Plato’s elenchus of Socrates. In his opinion, Socrates’
art of persuasion is exonerated “on the condition that Socrates overtly renounces
its benefits: knowledge as power, passion, pleasure. On the condition, in a word,
that he consents to die.”6 Derrida recognized an Athenian scapegoat (pharmakos)
in Socrates.7
Indeed, Socrates’ ugliness is the ugliness of pharmacoi (the ugliest persons
in Athens). It fits perfectly with the ugliness of a talmudic sage, a prerequisite of
sagacity and a sign of humility (B. Ta’anit 7a–b). Laughably humiliated, a sage is a
farcical figure. A villain may be a farcical figure as well. A popular legend tells of
Xanthippe emptying a chamber pot over Socrates. In talmudic literature, a servant-
maid empties dirty water on a sage (B. Yoma 87a; cf. Y. Mo’ed Qatan 3:1).
Haman’s own daughter spills the contents of a chamber pot on his head and
then hurls herself to her death before his eyes (B. Megilla 16a). In the Talmud,
Israel herself is a farcical character in the moments of her tragic humiliation (cf.
B. Gittin 55b–58a, etc.). Eikhah Rabbah, which deals with the climax of Israel’s
sufferings, is the most humorous collection of midrashim. A scapegoat is a
clown (either a villain or a saint or both). His death or humiliation is Aufhebung
(both sublation and ablution, purification). I believe that comic relief through
sacrifice (not “the deeply antagonistic, dialogical relations”) was the nature of
spoudogeloion. To clearly formulate this thesis I need Socrates and the Fat
Rabbis, a great book that brings notably serious and comical questions to the
fore. Read Boyarin!
Arkady Kovelman
Lomonosov Moscow State University
Moscow, Russia
• • •
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Gail Labovitz. Marriage and Metaphor: Constructions of Gender in Rabbinic
Literature. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009. x, 289 pp.
doi:10.1017/S0364009411000134
In Marriage and Metaphor: Constructions of Gender in Rabbinic Litera-
ture, Gail Labovitz applies “cognitive metaphor theory” to the reading of rabbinic
sources, in ways that illuminate rabbinic literature in general and rabbinic con-
structions of marriage and gender in particular. Like Daniel Boyarin’s exploration
of intertextuality in midrash and David Stern’s examination of rabbinic parables,
Labovitz’s book demonstrates that rabbinic sources ought to be read along with
contemporary literary and linguistic theories. Labovitz’s thesis: “‘A woman is
5. Ibid., 118–19.
6. Ibid., 120.
7. Ibid., 128–34.
Acquired’ (and the corollaries, ‘Women are Ownable’ and ‘Marriage is Owner-
ship’) is a deep, culturally entrenched metaphor in rabbinic thinking, and the
central model by which rabbis construct their system of marriage and gender
relations” (1) is compellingly argued and ultimately supported at every level of
analysis.
The introduction lays out “cognitive metaphor theory” in a lucid and excit-
ing manner. (The chapter also discusses some lacunae regarding gender in meta-
phor theory and introduces the reader to contemporary methods and approaches to
rabbinic sources). Citing George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s Metaphors We Live
By as her entryway into cognitive metaphor theory, Labovitz explains the impor-
tance of metaphoric language for thought: “metaphor is an integral part of our con-
ceptual systems” and “metaphors are not primarily located in language, but in
thought” (3). Citing the earlier work of Ricoeur, Labovitz also describes the
“paradox” of metaphor, how “the metaphorical ‘is’ at once signifies both ‘is
not’ and ‘is like’” (3).
Chapter 1 discusses M. Kiddushin 1:1, the text that contains the word that
served as the impetus for this study, niknet (is acquired): “A woman is acquired
in three ways, and acquires herself in two ways.” Here Labovitz engages previous
scholarship that addressed the question, “Are women property in the rabbinic
system of marriage?” (32, 251). Labovitz finds this underlying question in need
of reconsideration, writing, “To ask ‘are women property in the system of the
Mishnah,’ and the broader spectrum of rabbinic literature as well, with the expec-
tation that an answer of either yes or no (or even yes in some situations and no in
others) can be reached, is to ask for something that cannot be forthcoming. Rather,
the kinyan of M. Kiddushin 1:1 is a paradox, a purchase and not a purchase, both
and neither, all at once” (39). The chapter also reviews other linguistic expressions
(e.g., “ba’al isha”; “purchase made in error”; and even “nissuin”) that attest to the
underlying metaphor of rabbinic marriage: Women are ownable (40–47). The
careful linguistic analysis of the chapter thus reveals the hierarchy of rabbinic
gender relations surrounding marriage (and beyond) that conceives of men as
active agents and women as passive objects (48–49) as “the metaphor of owner-
ship serves to naturalize, and thus reproduce, this gender imbalance in the very
structure of the language in which rabbinic texts discuss and construct marriage”
(48). The metaphor of “Women are Ownable/Marriage is Ownership,” moreover,
reveals a “lexical gap” in rabbinic thinking about marriage; “at minimum the meta-
phor serves to restrict linguistic options” that would allow for female agency or
shared agency (52–53).
In Chapter 2, Labovitz explores whether or not the (polysemic) term kid-
dushin provides a countermodel to the marriage-as-ownership metaphor devel-
oped throughout her book. At stake in the valorization of the rabbinic use of k,
d,sh (over and against k,n,h) is that k,d,sh “encompasses meanings of holiness
and sanctification.” Thus, kiddushin has been read as a positive linguistic/semantic
change that reflects a cultural change in rabbinic ideas about marriage (and
gender). Labovitz complicates and challenges such a reading, and concludes,
“K,d,sh as used in the rabbinic lexis of marriage clearly functions as part of the
ownership metaphor epitomized by the phrase ‘a woman is acquired’” and, “we
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must recognize as inaccurate, or at best incomplete, the assertion that kiddushin as
a marriage term must, by virtue of its apparent root k,d,sh, impart connotations of
holiness and sanctity to the rabbinic conception of marriage” (73; emphasis
added).
Chapters 3 and 4 form a unit, each exploring the productiveness, pervasive-
ness, and internal coherence of the rabbinic marriage metaphor of ownership.
Again, cognitive metaphor theory is used to show how a basic metaphor (i.e.,
woman as ownable) provides many opportunities for expansion and elaboration.
Chapter 3 focuses on metaphors of real estate—women as fields and houses. Par-
ticularly insightful here is that after treating each metaphor on its own, Labovitz
notes the overlap between them: “In a few instances, we even find ‘spill over’
between them and blending of images from the two different source realms”
(128–29). Chapter 4 moves on to discuss metaphors that associate women with
slaves and their shared status as “outsiders-within.” Here I found her investigation
into the rabbinic grouping of women and slaves (and minors) an important contri-
bution to the discussion of these groups’ exemption from Torah study and com-
mandments. Working from the woman-as-ownable (as a slave is ownable)
metaphor, she is able to finesse the connections between slaves and women and
the differences between those two groups and that of (male) minors.
Chapter 5 analyzes the various monetary exchanges that the rabbis discuss
in connection with marriage. Labovitz charts the trend, present in tannaitic sources
but culminating in the Bavli, “towards expanding male control over female prop-
erty in betrothal and marriage” (216). Against those who claim that the ketubah, or
rabbinic marriage contract, negates the element(s) of purchase in rabbinic marriage
by its deferral of payment, and thus reflects a move away from the “biblical”
mohar (bridewealth), Labovitz writes, “What we have here is not a historical
account of the process by which a rabbi or rabbis converted mohar into
ketubah, thereby moving away from a purchase model of marriage, but rather
quite the opposite, a cultural construction in which rabbis actively endeavor to
indelibly insert and inscribe bridewealth back into the genealogy of the
ketubah” (233). The metaphor of woman as ownable—marriage as ownership—
thus stands undeterred and not really deferred as “the money given and pledged
to a woman at marriage contains within itself, as it were, the very means by
which it and all her property comes under the husband’s control” (233).
Labovitz’s conclusory chapter reiterates that the dominant—and exclusive—
metaphor and/or model of rabbinic marriage is one of ownership. One can catch
glimpses of marriage as “partnership,” and spouses as “fellows” (246–47), but
nothing challenges the dominant metaphor. She points out that as this metaphor
of marriage works to construct women as ownable, passive objects, it simul-
taneously constructs men as “owners, masters, freemen; in short as socially and cul-
turally dominant” (250). Labovitz ends with a personal discussion of the metaphor
she married by, which briefly engages with the politics of rabbinic marriage today
and provides an eloquent example of how the personal is the political. Here she
worries, “If the ritual form of my own and many others’ weddings remains ‘remark-
ably constant’ with the betrothal and marriage procedures described in classical
rabbinic literature, then I have to address the possibility, even likelihood, that
158
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marriage rituals in many Jewish communities today ‘are still entirely amenable to a
former, harmful justification that abides conspicuously in canonical sources’” (253).
Although this constancy might be true for some, in addition to pointing to Rachel
Adler’s B’rit Ahuvim ceremony as a starting point for moving forward, Labovitz
might also have directed her readers to numerous other wedding or marriage
models that have developed over the twelve years since Adler’s work (see, for
example, http://www.ritualwell.org/). Thus whereas Labovitz finds it “emotionally
easier to accept the continued authority of these traditions,” many have not. This
is not to criticize Labovitz’s book in any manner, nor her personal reflections. It
simply demonstrates the need for critical, engaged feminist scholarship—exempli-
fied throughout her book—and the productiveness both of feminists who remain
within an authoritative tradition (as “outsiders-within”?) and those who position
themselves beyond such authority.
Gwynn Kessler
Swarthmore College
Swarthmore, Pennsylvania
• • •
Peter Schäfer. Die Geburt des Judentums aus dem Geist des Christentums: Fünf
Vorlesungen zur Entstehung des rabbinischen Judentums. Tria Cordia: Jenaer Vor-
lesungen zu Judentum, Antike und Christentum 6. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010.
xvii, 210 pp., 5 Abb.
doi:10.1017/S0364009411000146
It was the title of this little book (The Birth of Judaism from the Spirit of
Christianity: Five Lectures Concerning the Origins of Rabbinic Judaism)1 that
caught my immediate attention. Of course, that is the intent of any title. But this
book’s title, the published version of five lectures that Peter Schäfer presented
at the University of Jena (in the series of annual lectures about Judaism, Antiquity,
and Christianity) two years ago, did so not merely because of its Nietzschean ring,
an aspect which may or may not have been intentional. More significantly, the title
makes a rather daring claim, as to overturning the traditional genealogy of Judaism
and Christianity. Now it is Christianity that is put in the place of the mother, who
gives birth to her daughter Judaism.
A maternal kinship metaphor has reigned over scholarly discourse in reli-
gious and Jewish studies for so long. One might have thought, however, that at
the latest, since Alan Segal’s insightful study Rebecca’s Children: Judaism and
Christianity in the Roman World (1986),2 the maternal metaphor would have
fallen by the wayside. Indeed, Segal only implemented for the scholarly imagin-
ation, what in early Christian and rabbinic typological exegesis had been more or
1. Quotes from the book in this review are my own translations from the German original.
2. Harvard University Press. Schäfer does not mention this book in his study.
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